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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a two period general equilibrium model that incorporates firms
learning-by-doing under the green subsidies. I use a dynamic version of Dixit-Stiglitz
monopolistic competition model to analyze the impact of an introduction of green
subsidies in the presence of pre-existing effluent taxes. I first show that introduction
of green subsidies promotes the demands of green goods, and consumers are better
off each period. I then show that even when the green subsidies directly accrue to
consumers, firms in the green sector also benefit via boosted demands of the green
goods. Learning-by-doing effect accelerates the speed of expansion of the green sector
in the face of green subsidies. On the other hand, even when the demand for the green
goods is promoted, and more pollution may involve meeting the increased demand as
a whole, environmental quality may still improve if the technology is good enough to
sufficiently boost the net positive impact of green consumption on the environment.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
From water pollution to global warming, increasing evidence supports the claim
that unless we change our consumption patterns, the world will eventually face un-
acceptable levels of environmental crisis. In response to an urgent need to tailor
patterns of economic growth, many environmental technologies have been developed
and adopted for various types of goods. The field of green technology encompasses
a wide range of evolving subfields, from energy generation to the creation of recy-
cled or renewable products. The effort to find innovative solutions that meet en-
vironmental requirements leads to more effective products. Over the last decade,
the federal government has provided massive subsidies to support various emerging
activities that push the world toward less dangerous climate change. To improve
environmental quality by changing our consumption patterns, the government has
an interest in promoting faster adoption of environmentally conscious products by
creating economic incentives that ultimately help the environment. Many empirical
reports demonstrate that demand-side subsidies encourage the consumption of the
targeted good. Green subsidies seem to support targeted industries and restructure
the market by letting the consumers choose green goods. Though it sounds plausible,
this argument deserves scrutiny. When new technology and new product emerge, I
check to see whether the introduction of such a subsidy helps better establish the
market by boosting the firm’s profit and supporting its effort to push a learning-by-
doing effect via promoted demand of goods by individuals.
When the government generates bias in favor of certain goods, incidence analysis
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becomes important, because special interest groups often hinder the creation or elim-
ination of such a policy. Since fiscal year 2009, nearly $54 billion has been granted
as demand or supply side energy-related tax subsidies according to the Institute for
Energy Research (IER)1. There is much debate surrounding the elimination of such
subsidies. Moreover, one of the basic issues concerning such an environmental policy
is whether it will yield the intended improvement. Green tax credits are known to
consumers when they make consumption decisions. Some argue that the reduction
of the price of targeted green goods through consumer subsidies only benefits con-
sumers, thereby diverting resources from more efficient uses. When the statutory tax
benefit accrues to purchasers of qualifying green goods by way of lump-sum rebate,
it is tempting to say that all tax benefits go to the consumers.
To seek true tax credit incidence, I develope a two-period general equilibrium
dynamic incidence analysis model that incorporates the supplier’s learning-by-doing
or technology innovation under the green subsidy. For the simplicity of analysis, I
introduce two sectors of production, namely varieties of conventional consumption
goods and innovative green consumption goods, such as hybrid cars, energy-efficient
kitchen appliances, non-toxic cleaner goods and so on with their conventional coun-
terparts. Because innovative technology is still developing, the cost of production of
these goods decreases as more experience is obtained. The growth of technology is
modeled by a function of the accumulated outputs that have been sold, capturing the
idea of learning-by-doing.
As new initiatives are continuously developed and compete with each other in the
green sector, large heterogeneity is introduced via a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monop-
1http://data.instituteforenergyresearch.org/tax-subsidies/renewables/
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olistic competition model. Equipped with their own unique features in productivity,
firms producing varieties of innovative goods compete with each other’s market pow-
ers. In this model, given the initial productivity parameter, each firm producing
a variety chooses how much to produce today, knowing that it will affect the next
period’s productivity. The green sector is assumed to face a higher growth rate in
technology reflecting its undeniable growth potential. That is, green technology is
assumed to evolve faster. It is motivated by the observation that green investment
grows fast2. In recent years, investor have been supporting innovative research and
advanced technologies in much greater size and proportion, which has become a ro-
bust source of growth in green sectors. Higher level of accumulated outputs sold can
be paired with better ability in learning-by-doing, or a greater chance of attracting
such investment.
The firm producing green goods does not necessarily use clean technology. Be-
cause pollution is an inevitable byproduct of production, the government levies an
effluent tax to limit the amount of carbon that can be emitted from plants. By
imposing such taxes, the government urges plants to look into solutions that make
production cleaner or more efficient. As long as they are coupled with charges that
accurately reflect the environmental damage of each type of goods, the effluent tax
provides correct incentive to react. Green subsidies may impose an extra burden on
public budgets, however, having prices that reflect true costs or benefits under con-
sideration of the environmental quality would send correct signal to households and
firms to use the targeted good more efficiently.
2“Green tech investments growing fast,” The San Francisco Chronicle, January 17, 2008, Green
Transition Inflection Point: Green Transition Scoreboard 2013 Report
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My model is a dynamic variant of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic com-
petition model in which a firm’s cumulative output of goods determines its constant
marginal cost. I study such a model to show that even when a subsidy directly accrues
to consumers, a firm also benefits if it is a dynamic entity. The consequence of accu-
mulated output becomes important for a firm’s strategy. This is because it makes the
firm face a dynamic problem, as firm’s output decision in the first period affects the
productivity parameter in the second period via cumulative output of goods. Another
important feature of my model is that each firm’s decision affects the environmental
quality, and the government has interest to protect the environment. Even when the
demand is boosted as a whole, if the consumption pattern is well tailored and green
technology is good enough, the environmental quality may improve.
A firm’s process of learning-by-doing follows the idea of Arrow’s (1962) seminal
paper, “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing,” studying the relation-
ship between cost and cumulative output sold. Further works such as those by Rosen
(1972), Spence (1981), and Clarke, Darrough, and Heinecke (1982) showed how learn-
ing by doing affects dynamic pricing strategy as the production costs decrease in their
cumulative outputs. Fudenberg and Tirole (1982) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988)
showed the impact of learning by doing on the industry concentration and imperfect
competition. It may have further implication on a firm’s exit and entry decision,
but in this paper, to focus on how firms behave in the face of particular consumer
subsidies, the discussion begins when all firms have already made their decision on
entry or exit. This formal exploration of the strategic implications of emerging tech-
nologies allows us to study the firms as dynamic entities. The manufacturing sector,
especially the innovative industry, displays markedly large magnitudes of learning-
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by-doing, economies of scale3, or diffusion of innovation. In this way, dynamic aspect
is built on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Incidence analysis of consumer subsidy has been carried out in several previous
empirical works. One of the well-known examples of a government subsidy is the
hybrid car subsidy which is provided based on estimated energy efficiencies. In the
early part of the 2000s, the government offered a $2,000 tax deduction for hybrids.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a more extensive tax credit program last-
ing five years that offered to make pricier, but more environmentally friendly vehicles
more appealing. The rationale behind all these tax incentives was that many poten-
tial buyers required economic incentive to purchase more expensive hybrids over a
conventional automobile that runs solely on gasoline. Sallee (2011) used transaction
level data on new vehicle purchases and compared transaction prices just before and
just after each tax change to show that the actual price consumers paid for Prius
(excluding tax credit) moved very little, if at all. Given that Toyota faced a binding
production constraint, Sallee (2011) concluded that consumers captured the signifi-
cant majority of the benefits from tax subsidies for the Toyota Prius. On the other
hand, Chupp, Myles and Stephenson (2010) showed that almost half of the hybrid
car subsidy is capitalized into car prices using the transaction price. Subsidies on
other goods and services, such as higher education (Singell and Stone 2005; Long
2004; Dynarski 2000; Grubb and Oyer 2007) or housing (Susin 2002; Gibbons and
Manning 2006) have also been studied.
3Refer to Levitt, List, & Syverson (2013) for learning-by-doing in automobile industry. Refer to
Husan (1997), Huang (2002), and Truett and Truett (2003) for the importance of economy of scale
in the automobile industry.
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My paper contributes to the literature of subsidy incidence by complementing such
works constructing a dynamic model of tax credit incidence that captures learning-by-
doing across time. Because the incidence analysis in a static model does not consider
the firm’s dynamic optimization, the true benefit of the tax credit program for the
suppliers may have been underestimated. Many emerging firms may have always been
focused on the long horizon, determined to bring down their cost through learning-
by-doing and economies of scale.
We have been giving attention to environmental issues for decades, and more
and more environmentally friendly goods are on the way with developing technology.
To address environmental protection, many policies have been proposed (for reviews
of this literature, see Alm and Banzhaf 2010), and the promotion of the develop-
ment and adoption of green technology is one example. As more and more states
consider enacting tax credit policies to promote the demand for innovative environ-
mentally conscious goods, it is important to know which parties truly benefit, and
how the improvement of environmental quality is achieved. The trend toward green
has been and will be persistently driven by an underlying commitment to sustainable
development. I therefore believe that my conclusion can provide useful knowledge
for legislative decisions to enhance environmental quality via promoted demand of
environmentally-friendly products.
6
Chapter 2
TAX INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATIVE GOODS
Green subsidies apply to green counterparts of conventional goods: the Honda
Civic hybrid versus a normal Civic, energy efficient kitchen appliances versus conven-
tional appliances, and solar heating systems versus usual heating systems are exam-
ples. The government wants to promote green consumption by giving green subsidies
on green purchase.
In this section we take a brief view of the tax incentives for hybrid cars as an
example. Petroleum consumption in the private transportation sector accounts for
40 percent of gasoline consumption, 60 to 70 percent of total urban air pollution,
and 20 percent of the annual U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, according to a report
by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Dependency of the United States on for-
eign oil keeps increasing, and in recent years almost 60 percent of total petroleum
products have been imported. In the presence the continuous rise of gasoline prices,
unstable oil supplies, and growing concern over the increased influence of pollution
including global warming, the environment-friendly and fuel-efficient hybrid technol-
ogy is considered a desirable alternative to conventional technologies. To encourage
the purchase of hybrid or alternative fuel vehicles, at the federal level, the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 introduced a substantial personal income tax credit for hybrids1,
while at the state level, thirteen states have passed tax incentives for hybrids, and
many others have considered similar actions.
1http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Alternative-Motor-Vehicle-Credit
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From 2003 to 2005, original buyers of hybrid cars were eligible for a $2, 000 income
tax deduction, regardless of itemization. The reduction amount depends on his or
her marginal tax rate, and relatively small. IRS data indicates that tax liability was
reduced by $300 for those in the 15 percent rate bracket, while those in the 25 percent,
28 percent, and 33 percent tax brackets, received reductions of $500, $560, and $667,
respectively. When the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was passed in 2005, from January
1, 2006, the buyer of a qualified car could claim a more extensive tax credit, depend-
ing on fuel-efficiency, worth up to $3, 4002. For example, the values of these credit
for Toyota Prius, Honda Civic Hybrid, and the Honda Accord Hybrid were $3, 150,
$2, 100, and $1, 300, respectively. The credit is designed to phase out in steps when
an automaker sold 60, 000 hybrid vehicles, regardless of the models. Toyota reached
the threshold in June, 2006, and Honda in August, 2007. When an automaker hits
the bound, the credit stays the same in the corresponding and consecutive quarters,
then falls by half for the next two quarters, and falls again by another half for another
six months, and then expires completely. When Honda reached accumulated sales of
60, 000 in August, 2007, the credit of $1, 300 for the Accord Hybrid decreased to $650
in half a year, and then Honda stopped selling this model in April, 2008.
When this type of tax policy is enacted, benefits and costs accrue to individuals,
namely, individual households, individual firms. Knowledge of how much each party
gains can be very useful when the policy is implemented.
2http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Qualified-Hybrid-Vehicles
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Chapter 3
THE MODEL
Now, turn to the theoretical framework for assessing the subsidy incidence for
innovative green goods. To analyze true incidence of green subsidies, a general equi-
librium model is useful to capture the interaction of buyers and sellers in markets. I
consider a version of the two period Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model.
Time is discrete and labelled t = 1, 2. A simple two-sector model is developed to
investigate the interactions between tax subsidy and the potential benefits that firms
in the innovative sector may face.
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households of measure one. The preferences of
a representative consumer are given by a constant elasticity of substitution utility
function over two commodities,
U = U(c1, c2) (3.1)
=
(
cρ1 + c
ρ
2
) 1
ρ
(3.2)
where c1 is a conventional consumption commodity, and c2 is an innovative con-
sumption commodity. Commodities are imperfect substitutes, so ρ ∈ (0, 1)1. The
elasticity of substitution is σ = 1
1−ρ > 1. The households have access to technology
that uses a composite of differentiated goods ci(z)’s to produce each consumption
1If ρ = 1, then ci’s are perfect substitutes, while if ρ < 0, then they are complements (Brakman
et al. 2001).
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commodity ci. Given the varieties of the conventional or innovative product, the rep-
resentative household can transform infinitely many types of products into a desirable
conventional or innovative composite commodity to use,
ci =
[ ∫
z∈Ωi
ci(z)
ρdz
] 1
ρ
(3.3)
where the measure of the set Ωi represents the mass of available goods. Let
Ω1 = [0, α] and Ω2 = [α, 1], so that there is a unit mass of firms in this economy.
The household is endowed with a fixed unit of time, which is normalized to one. The
households supply labor to firms for the production of varieties. Since the household
does not value leisure, labor is inelastically supplied. The households own the firms
and face an intertemporal budget constraint as follows.
∫
z∈Ω1
pˆ1(z)c1(z)dz+
∫
z∈Ω2 pˆ2(z)c2(z)dz ≤ E (3.4)
pˆi(z) = pi(z) + τi(z) (3.5)
T g =
∫
z
γzc2(z)dz (3.6)
where pi(z) is the price of the differentiated good indexed by z in the sector
i = 1, 2 and τi(z) is the effluent tax for the firm indexed by z in sector i, E is the
total disposable income given by E ≡ w+ Π1 + Π2 +T +T g− T˜ , w is the equilibrium
wage rate, Πi is the aggregated profit earned due to the ownership of the firms in each
sector i, that is, Πi =
∫
z∈Ωi pii(z)dz where pii(z) is the profit of the firm indexed by z, T
, T g,T˜ and γz are government policies, T is lump-sum transfer, T
g is lump-sum green
subsidy, T˜ is the lump-sum tax, and γz is the green subsidy rate for the differentiated
good indexed by z in the green sector 2. When consumers make their decisions over
consumption, they know that the green subsidy, T g is calculated by (5) given {γz} and
is given back in the lump-sum manner. Consumption commodities, ci’s, directly enter
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the utility function. As was shown in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), consumer behavior
can be modeled with consumption commodities, ci’s, with associated aggregate prices,
pi’s.
pˆ1c1 + pˆ2c2 ≤ E (3.7)
pˆ1 = [
∫
z∈Ω1
pˆ1(z)
ρ
ρ−1dz]
ρ−1
ρ (3.8)
pˆ2 = [
∫
z∈Ω2
{pˆ2(z)− γz}
ρ
ρ−1dz]
ρ−1
ρ
Using these aggregates, the two-stage bugetting procedure with homothetic util-
ity function gives us the demands, ci(z)’s, and the optimal expenditures, ri(z) =
pi(z)ci(z),
c1(z) =
[
pˆ1(z)
pˆ1
]−σ
c1 (3.9)
c2(z) =
[
pˆ2(z)− γz
pˆ2
]−σ
c2
r1(z) =
[
pˆ1(z)
pˆ1
]1−σ
R1 (3.10)
r2(z) =
[
pˆ2(z)− γz
pˆ2
]1−σ
R2
where the aggregate expenditure Ri is given by Ri ≡ pˆici =
∫
z∈Ωi ri(z)dz. Note
that in the absence of green subsidy, the inter-sector elasticity of substitution and
intra-sector elasticity of substitution are assumed to be identical, as they are both
consumption goods. In the presence of green subsidy, the demand for green goods
becomes more elastic, and intra-sector elasticity is larger than inter-sector elasticity,
D1 =
1
1− ρ = σ
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D2 =
1
1− ρ
pˆ2(z)
pˆ2(z)− γz = σ
pˆ2(z)
pˆ2(z)− γz ≡ σ˜ > σ
3.2 Producers
The production structure consists of two consumption goods sectors: conventional
goods ({c1(z)}) and innovative goods ({c2(z)}). Each sector contains a continuum of
firms, each of which chooses to produce a different variety, z, in the corresponding
sector. The innovative sector is the green sector, which produces green counterparts
to conventional consumption goods. Green goods are more eco-friendly, character-
ized by their positive (net) impact on environmental quality. For example, the Honda
Civic hybrid is the green counterpart to the normal Civic. The Civic hybrid is clas-
sified as a green good because of its use of alternative energy, which has a relatively
positive impact on the environment. As another example, an energy-efficient kitchen
appliance is a green counterpart to a conventional kitchen appliance. A green appli-
ance is characterized by its improved energy efficiency.
Production requires only labor input. Firm technology is represented by a cost
function that exhibits a constant marginal cost, that is, labor demand, ni,t(z), is
given by a linear function of output, yi,t(z) = A(qi,t−1(z))ni,t(z), where qi,t−1 is the
accumulated output level up to time t− 1, evolving by qi,t(z) = qi,t−1(z) + yi,t(z), so
it is a fixed number at t. In this two-period model, the initial productivity parame-
ter, qi,0, is given at the first period, and qi,1 is determined endogeneously according
to the firm’s optimal decision at t = 1. In this way, each firm indexed by z incurs
production cost according to its productivity parameter, qi,t(z). The firm’s produc-
tivity parameter is given by its accumulated number of units sold so far. Because
firm’s output decision in the first period affects the productivity parameter in the
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second period, the firm faces a dynamic problem. A firm at t with productivity index
qi,t−1(z) has productivity of A(qi,t−1(z)) = qi,t−1(z)ψi with ψ2 > ψ1, reflecting the
undeniable growth potential of the green sector. Higher productivity is modeled by
lower marginal cost, which captures the concept of learning-by-doing, or innovation.
A firm that has sold more units demonstrates higher productivity based on its past
experience, that is, productivity at the firm level evolves over time, depending on the
level of production decision by the firm. At the beginning of period 1, a firm with a
productivity parameter qi,0 makes its output decision yi,1, knowing that it contributes
the next period’s productivity via the productivity parameter qi,1.
The firms producing the varieties in each sector are monopolistically competitive,
so demands are assumed to be known to the firms. With this evolution of firm
productivity, the expected discounted present value of profits for the firm is given
as follows. Taking wt, τi,t(z), demand, cost function, R, and the initial productivity
parameter qi,0 as given, the firm producing the type z chooses pi,t(z), yi,t(z), ni,t(z)
to solve
13
vi(z) = max
[
pii,1(z)
]
+
1
R
[
pii,2(z)
]
(3.11)
s.t. pii,t(z) = {pi,t(z)yi,t(z)− wtni,t}
yi,t(z) = qi,t(z)
ψini,t(z) (cost function)
qi,1(z) = qi,0(z) + yi,1(z)
y1,t(z) =
[
pˆ1,t
pˆ1,t(z)
] 1
1−ρ
y1,t (demand)
y2,t(z) =
[
pˆ1,t
pˆ1,t(z)− γz
] 1
1−ρ
y2,t
pˆi,t(z) = pi,t(z) + τi,t(z)
given qi,0.
where τi,t(z) is the effluent tax rate for each firm, and R is the exogeneously given
gross interest rate. It can be solved by backward induction from the terminal period.
The marginal firm is defined as the one that yields zero profit, that is, vi(qi,0) = 0.
To focus the analysis on the effect of the green subsidy, all firms in each sector are
assumed to make vi ≥ 0. That is, the firm with lowest productivity parameter in
each sector is the marginal firm, and no firm enters or exit. It can be viewed that
time in this economy starts after the firm’s entry or exit decision. Some firms may
make non-positive profit at t = 1, but overall profit must be vi ≥ 0.
3.3 Environment and Government Regulation
Environmental (air) quality is affected by the production of the economy. The
production process contributes to air pollution. Denote ξ as the air quality.
ξt = Ht(y1,t, y2,t, c2,t) (3.12)
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where yi,t is a vector of yi,t(z)’s, and c2,t is a vector of c2,t(z)’s. Ht is decreasing
in yi,t(z)’s, reflecting the fact that pollution is an inevitable byproduct of production,
and increasing in c2,t(z) for all z, since they are green goods. Assume that Ht(·)
is strictly convex in yi,t’s. When each firm makes an optimal decision, it does not
internalize its impact on the environmental quality.
Pollution is an inevitable byproduct generated in the process of production. The
government cares about environment quality, and thus takes command and control
environmental regulation, setting a Pigouvian effluent tax on the production side,
and providing a consumption subsidy on the green demand side. We assume that the
government knows the marginal impact of each firm’s output on the environment.
Environmental regulation by the government is given as follows. Based on its esti-
mation of the environmental effect of the arguments, it sets per unit emission taxes
τi,t(z) by
τi,t(z) = − ∂Ht
∂yi,t(z)
(3.13)
where not necessarily τ1,t(z) > τ2,t(z), reflecting the fact that a green sector may
not be a clean sector. Similarly, we also assume that the government knows the
net marginal impact of each green good demand on the environment. For example,
when the consumer chooses to purchase an energy efficient refrigerator instead of a
conventioanl one, the government knows how much energy will be saved due to this
decision. Based on its correct estimation of environmental effect of the green demand,
it provides green subsidy c2,t(z)’s by
γz,t =
∂Ht
∂c2,t(z)
. (3.14)
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Following Harberger (1964), the government rebates all tax revenues to the rep-
resentative agent in a lump-sum manner, hence:
Tt = Σi
∫
z
τi,t(z)yi,t(z)
T gt =
∫
z
γzy2,t(z)
3.4 Equilibrium
Assume that we have an interior solution. In equilibrium, all markets are cleared
at the equilibrium price. Hence, feasibility requires for the consumption goods:
ci,t(z) = yi,t(z) (3.15)
The feasibility constraint on labor is given by
∫
n1,t(z)dz +
∫
n2,t(z)dz = 1 (3.16)
An equilibrium in this economy is a collection of sequences of aggregate prices
and wages {R, p1,t,p2,t, wt}, monopolistic competitors’ prices {pi,t(z)}, a collection
of sequences of marginal firms’ prices {p∗i,t(z)}, a collection of sequences of aggre-
gate quantities {yi,t, ci,t, ni,t}, and quantities of monopolistically competitive goods
{ci,t(z), ni,t(z)}, a collection of sequences of marginal firms’ quantities {q∗i,t(z)}, a col-
lection of sequences of the profit of the firms {pii,t(z)}, and a collection of government
policies {τi,t(z), γz, Tt, T gt , T˜} such that
1. Taking prices, wage rate, government policies as given, {ci.t(z)} solves the
household problem each period;
2. Taking prices, wage rate, demand, government polices as given, {pi.t(z)},
{yi,t(z)}, {ni,t(z)} solve the firm’s problem;
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3. The marginal firm earns zero profit: marginal firm with q∗i,0 is such that
vi,1(q
∗
i,0) = 0;
4. The markets are cleared;
yi,t(z) = ci,t(z)
Σi
∫
z
ni,t(z)dz = 1
5. The government’s budget constraint holds each period.
Tt = Σi
∫
z
τi,t(z)yi,t(z)
T gt =
∫
z
γzy2,t(z)
17
Chapter 4
THE INCIDENCE OF THE GREEN CONSUMPTION SUBSIDY
Green subsidies are known to consumers when they make decisions. The statutory
tax benefit accrues to purchasers of qualifying innovative goods by way of a lump sum
rebate. I analyze the reaction of each firm in the innovative sector in the presence of
the green subsidy, and check how its profit varies accordingly. Because producers are
assumed to focus solely on profit, the change in profit is the relevant monetary mea-
sure of the change in welfare. A bigger increase in profit represents a bigger benefit
from a tax incentive on innovative goods.
In real-world examples of consumer subsidies, the government evaluates the pos-
itive impact of targeted activity on the environment and returns its estimated mon-
etary contribution. Hybrid or pure electric car subsidies, home energy efficiency
subsidies, and solar financing subsidies are examples. Regarding the tax credit for
the hybrid car, Beresteanu and Li (2011) used the dataset of new vehicle registrations
in 22 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas from 1999 to 2006 to find that the federal
hybrid tax credit accounts for 27 percent of the diffusion of hybrid vehicles sales in
2006. Especially for the Toyota Prius, Sallee (2011) finds the surprising result that
consumers are the only party that fully captures the hybrid tax incentive. Here, I
show that some benefits of the subsidies also pass on to producers to the extent that
productivity rises in response to subsidies. That is, the green good supplier may
receive some positive amount of the tax preferences.
Before starting analysis, note that the consumer’s problem is a standard concave
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optimization program with a strictly concave and continuous objective function over a
convex constraint. Therefore, we know that there exists a unique solution. The firm’s
problem is a bit tricky. Each firm’s problem can be solved by backward induction, its
objective function can be reduced to one-variable problem in the first period’s price
with given constraints. The second period’s profit decreases as the first period’s price
increases (see Appendix). I find the first period’s optimal price, which leads to some
loss today, expecting further gain tomorrow.
Proposition 1 : Green subsidies promote the purchase of green goods. That is,
the demands of green goods and expenditure on them increase, as do the demand for
aggregate good, and its budget share.
Proof. First we solve the consumer’s problem to derive demands function for
green goods. The consumer’s problem can be solved in two-steps. The Lagrangian
L = U(c1, c2) + λ[E − pˆ1c1 − pˆ2c2] yields the first-order conditions:
∂L
∂ci
= Uci − λpˆi
∂L
∂λ
= pˆ1c1 + pˆ2c2 − w
which implies that
c1
c2
=
(
pˆ1
pˆ2
)−σ
.
Denote s(c2) is the budget share for c2. Then, since U is homothetic, the com-
modity demands are:
c1 = (1− s(c2))w/pˆ1
c2 = s(c2)w/pˆ2.
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For the next step, from the Lagrangian L =
[ ∫
z
c2(z)
ρ
] 1
ρ
+ λ[s(c2)E −
∫
z
{pˆ2(z)−
γz}c2(z)], we obtain the first-order conditions:
∂L
∂c2(z)
= c2(z)
ρ−1c
1
ρ
2 − λ{pˆ2(z)− γz} = 0
∂L
∂λ
=
∫
z
{pˆ2(z)− γz}c2(z)− s(c2)E = 0
which implies that
c2(z) =
[
pˆ2
pˆ2(z)− γz
] 1
1−ρ
c2
where the price index pˆ2 is given by pˆ2 = [
∫
z
pˆ(z)
ρ
ρ−1 ]
ρ−1
ρ . From (3.8) ∂
(
c2,t(z) =[
pˆ2,t(z)
pˆ2,t
]−σ
c2,t
)
/∂p2,t(z) = −σ
[
pˆ2,t(z)
pˆ2,t
]−σ−1
c2,t < 0, we know that c2,t(z) increases
for all z, and so does c2,t. From (3.9), ∂
(
r2,t(z) =
[
pˆ2,t(z)
pˆ2,t
]1−σ
R2,t
)
/∂p2,t(z) =
(1 − σ)
[
pˆ2,t(z)
pˆ2,t
]−σ
R2,t < 0, since σ > 1, we know that r2,t(z) increases, and so do
R2,t = pˆ2,tc2,t = s(c2,t)E and s(c2,t). Apparently, as green subsidy increases, dispos-
able income E increases, and the consumers get better off at each period. 
Proposition 2 : The green sector benefits under green subsidies, which accrue
directly to consumers. The learning-by-doing effect amplifies this benefit.
Proof. Solving by backward induction, in the terminal period, each firm in sector
1 chooses the profit maximizing markup equals to σ/(σ − 1) = 1/ρ, and those in
the sector 2 choose σ˜/(σ˜ − 1) = 1/ρ˜. The optimal pricing rules in the second period
become:
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pˆ1,2(z) =
w2
ρ
(
1
q1,t−1(z)
)ψ1
(4.1)
pˆ2,2(z)− γz = w2
ρ˜
(
1
q2,t−1(z)
)ψ2
where 1
ρ˜
≡ σ
(
pˆ2,2(z)
pˆ2,2(z)−γz
)
/[σ
(
pˆ2,2(z)
pˆ2,2(z)−γz
)
− 1] > 1
ρ
with ρ˜ < ρ, wt is wage rate
hereafter normalized to one, so R is expressed in terms of labor unit. In the presence
of γz > 0, the effective markup gets higher. This is because the green subsidy makes
the demand more elastic. Given this optimal pricing rule, optimal output level is
given by (3.9) and (3.15), and the labor demand is given by cost function. Note that
all z, z′ with z 6= z′, qi,t−1(z) = qi,t−1(z′) solve the same problem. Rewriting (4.1)
yields,
pˆ1,2(qi,t−1) =
w2
ρ
(
1
q1,t−1
)ψ1
(4.2)
pˆ2,2(qi,t−1)− γz = w2
ρ˜
(
1
q2,t−1
)ψ2
Using this pricing rule, denoting vi = vi,1 +
1
R
vi,2, firm profits in the second period
are then (see Appendix for derivations)
vi,2(qi,1) = ri,2(qi,1)− ni,2(qi,1) (4.3)
v1,2(q1,1) =
1 + σ
σ
r1,2(q1,1)− τ1,2(z)
q1,1(z)ψ1
v2,2(q2,1) =
1 + σ˜
σ˜
r2,2(q2,1)− τ2,2(z)
q2,1(z)ψ1
where 1+σ˜
σ˜
> 1+σ
σ
and the revenues are given by
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r1,2(q1,1) = R1,2(
pˆ1,2ρq
ψ1
1,1
1 + τ1,2(q1.1)ρq
ψ1
1,1
)σ−1 (4.4)
r2,2(q2,1) = R2,2(
pˆ2,2ρ˜q
ψ1
2,1
1 + τ2,2(q2,1)ρ˜q
ψ1
2,1
)σ−1
so that the profits expressed in terms of aggregate price index and aggregate
revenue are
v1,2(q1,1) =
1 + σ˜
σ˜
R1,2(
pˆ1,2ρq
ψ1
1,1
1 + τ1,2(q1.1)ρq
ψ1
1,1
)σ−1 − τ1,2(z)
q1,1(z)ψ1
(4.5)
v2,2(q2,1) =
1 + σ˜
σ˜
R2,2(
pˆ2,2ρ˜q
ψ1
2,1
1 + τ2,2(q2,1)ρ˜q
ψ1
2,1
)σ−1 − τ2,2(z)
q2,1(z)ψ1
From (3.9), (4.2),
yi,2(qi,1)
yi,2(q′i,1)
=
(
qi,1
q′i,1
)σ+ψi
;
ri,2(qi,1)
ri,2(q′i,1)
=
(
qi,1
q′i,1
)σ−1+ψi
(4.6)
Therefore, in the second period, a more productive firm yields larger output and
revenue, charges lower prices, and earns higher profit. If the green sector had not
admitted the learning-by-doing effect and its productivity had stayed unchanged at
its initial level, then it would have earned lower profit. Since ∂vi,2(z)/∂pi,1(z) < 0 (see
Appendix), if the firm sets the first period price according to its markup as in the ter-
minal period, it would not be optimal. The firm would rather choose lower price in the
first period to maximize the discounted sum of the profits according to ∂vi/∂pi,1(z) =
∂vi,1(z)/∂pi,1(z) + ∂vi,2(z)/∂pi,1(z) = 0. Since ∂
2vi,2(z)/∂pi,1(z)∂γz < 0, in the pres-
ence of green subsidy, we know that the firm’s discounted present value vi(z) satis-
fies ∂vi/∂γz = (∂vi,1(z)/∂pi,1(z))(∂pi,1(z)/∂γz)+(∂vi,2(z)/∂pi,2(z))(∂pi,2(z)/∂γz) > 0.
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Therefore, the firms in the green sector benefit in the presence of green subsidies. 
Note that in the presence of pre-existing emission taxes, introduction of a green
subsidy may improve air quality if the technology is sufficiently green. Since the
firm does not take into account the impact of its decision on environmental quality,
it generates negative externality in production, namely pollution, while the demand
on a green good similarly generates positive externality. Even when the demand for
the green goods is promoted, and more pollution may involve meeting the increased
demand as a whole, environmental quality may still improve if the technology is good
enough to sufficiently boost the net positive impact of green consumption on the
environment. For example, when consumers purchase electric vehicles instead of con-
ventional cars, the amount of contributing factors to pollution will decrease, which is
described by the net positive impact of the electric vehicles consumption. In turn, air
quality will improve, which will decrease the effluent tax rate. By substitution effect,
it may increase the total number of cars in the economy, and increase the emission in
the production process accordingly. If the positive impact of green consumption, that
is, the reduction in the greenhouse gas intensity of green goods that occurs is large
enough to offset the negative impact from production, the changed allocation among
conventional and innovative green goods will improve the environmental quality.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUDING REMARK
This paper presents a two-period general equilibrium model that incorporates the
firm’s learning-by-doing under the green subsidies. I use a dynamic version of the
Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model to analyze the impact of the introduc-
tion of green subsidies in the presence of pre-existing effluent taxes. I first show
that the introduction of green subsidies promotes the demand for green goods, and
consumers are better off each period. I then show that even when the green subsi-
dies directly accrue to consumers, firms in the green sector also benefit via boosted
demand for green goods. The learning-by-doing effect accelerates the speed of ex-
pansion of the green sector in the face of green subsidies. On the other hand, even
when the demand for the green goods increases, and greater pollution may result from
meeting the increased demand as a whole, environmental quality may still improve if
the technology is good enough to sufficiently boost the net positive impact of green
consumption on the environment.
People seem to agree that tax credits on innovative environment-friendly goods
works well for environmental problems, and also make it easier for people to adopt
clean and efficient green technologies. In spite of efforts to spare the environment,
some people raise concern about this type of promotion, especially when it seems to
impose an extra burden on public budgets. That is, the double dividend issue arises.
For example, when comes to the renewable energy, because it causes gasoline tax
revenue to drop, which are used to pay for local highway and bridge maintenance.
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Almost 40 percent of state revenue for highways comes from fuel taxes revenue1.
Three states enacted additional fees on the cars and at least five others states have
considered similar actions to make up for losses in tax revenues, under the assump-
tion that people who use roads must pay for them. Washington state introduced
a $100 annual fee for electric-car owners,; Virginia imposed $64 for hybrid and elec-
tric cars, and; New Jersey considers $50 for electric and compressed natural-gas cars2.
Regarding the decreased amount of tax revenue, we may take the view that if the
government were to transfer the exact amount it would need to abate the increased
amount of pollution emitted from conventional vehicles in the absence of the tax pol-
icy, the decreased tax revenue would be less of a concern. But, if the transfer exceeds
that amount, then net tax revenue decreases, and may worsen the distortion effect of
the pre-existing taxes. We leave this question for our future work. The focus of this
paper remains the question of incidence––which parties truly benefit from hybrid tax
incentives.
12012 report by the Denver-based National Conference of State Legislatures
2http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-04/losing-revenue-from-hybrids-prompts-states-to-
hit-owners.html
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX
Derivation of (4.1):
vi,2(z) = max{pi,2(z)yi,2(z)− w2ni,t(z)}
= max{pi,2(z)yi,2(z)− w2
[{1/A(qi,1(z))}yi,2(z)]}
[pi,2(z)] : yi,2(z) + pi,2(z)
∂yi,2(z)
∂pi,2(z)
− {w2/A(qi,1(z))}∂yi,2(z)
∂pi,2(z)
= 0
1 +
∂yi,2(z)
∂pˆi,2(z)
pˆi,2(z)
yi,2(z)
pi,2(z)
pˆi,2(z)
− {w2/A(qi,1(z))}∂yi,2(z)
∂pˆi,2(z)
pˆi,2(z)
yi,2(z)
1
pˆi,2(z)
= 0
[p1,2(z)] : 1− σ = −w2/A(q1,1(z))
p1,2(z)
σ
Markup1 =
p1,2(z)
w2/A(q1,1(z))
=
σ
σ − 1 =
1
ρ
> 1
[p2,2(z)] : Markup2 =
σ
(
pˆ2,2(z)
pˆ2,2(z)−γz
)
σ
(
pˆ2,2(z)
pˆ2,2(z)−γz
)
− 1
=
1
ρ˜
>
1
ρ
Derivation of (4.3):
y1,2(q1,1) =
(
pˆ1,2(z)
pˆ1,2
)−σ
c1,2 =
(
r1,2(z)
R1,2
)(
pˆ1,2(z)
pˆ1,2
)−1
c1,2
= r1,2(z){ρq1,1(z)ψ1 + τ1,2(z)}
{1/A(q1,1(z))}y1,2(z) = r1,2(z)ρ+ τ1,t(z)/q1,1(z)ψ1
v1,2(q1,1) =
1 + σ
σ
r1,2(q1,1)− τ1,2(z)
q1,1(z)ψ1
Similarly,
y2,2(q2,1) =
(
pˆ2,2(z)− γz
pˆ2,2
)−σ
c2,2 =
(
r2,2(z)
R2,2
)(
pˆ2,2(z)− γz
pˆ2,2
)−1
c2,2
= r2,2(z){˜ρq2,1(z)ψ2 + τ2,t(z)}
{1/A(q2,1(z))}y2,2(z) = r2,2(z)ρ˜+ τ2,t(z)/q2,1(z)ψ2
v2,2(q2,1) =
1 + σ˜
σ˜
r2,2(q2,1)− τ2,2(z)
q2,1(z)ψ1
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Note. 1− ρ = 1
σ
; ρ˜ < ρ; σ˜ < σ, so 1+σ˜
σ˜
> 1+σ
σ
.
Derivation of (4.4):
r1,2(q1,1) = R1,2
(
pˆ1,2(q1,1)
pˆ1,2
)1−σ
= R1,2
(
1/A(q1,1)
ρpˆ1,2
+
τ1,2(q1,1)
pˆ1,2
)1−σ
= R1,2
(
pˆ1,2
1/ρqψ11,1 + τ1,2(q1,1)
)σ−1
= R1,2(
pˆ1,2ρq
ψ1
1,1
1 + τ1,2(q1,1)ρq
ψ1
1,1
)σ−1
Similarly,
r2,2(q2,1) = R2,2
(
pˆ2,2(q2,1)− γz
pˆ2,2
)1−σ
= R2,2
(
1/A(q2,1)
ρ˜pˆ2,2
+
τ2,2(q2,1)
pˆ2,2
)1−σ
= R2,2(
pˆ2,2ρ˜q
ψ1
2,1
1 + τ2,2(q2,1)ρ˜q
ψ1
2,1
)σ−1
Proposition 2:
v1,2(z) =
1
ρ
[w2/A(q1,1(z))]y
∗
1,2(z)− w2[1/A(q1,1(z))y∗1,2(z)]
=
[
1
ρ
− 1
]
{1/A(q1,1(z))}y∗1,2(z) (∵ w2 = 1)
=
[
1− ρ
ρ
]
{1/A(q1,1(z))}
[
ρpˆ1,2
1/A(q1,1(z))
] 1
1−ρ
y1,2
=
[
1− ρ
ρ
]
(ρpˆ1,2)
1
1−ρ {1/A(q1,1(z))}−
ρ
1−ρ y1,2
=
[
1− ρ
ρ
]
(ρpˆ1,2)
1
1−ρ q1,1(z)
ρψ1
1−ρ y1,2
=
[
1− ρ
ρ
]
(ρpˆ1,2)
1
1−ρ
{
q1,0(z) +
[
pˆ1,1
pˆ1,1(z)
] 1
1−ρ
y1,2
}
ρψ1
1−ρ y1,2
∂v1,2(z)
∂p1,1(z)
=
[
1− ρ
ρ
]
(ρpˆ1,2)
1
1−ρ pˆ
ρψ1
(1−ρ)2
1,1
(
− ρψ1
(1− ρ)2
)
pˆ1,1(z)
ρψ1
(1−ρ)2−1y
ρψ1
(1−ρ)2
1,2 < 0
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v2,2(z) =
(
1
ρ˜
[w2/A(q2,1(z))] + γz
)
y∗2,2(z)− w2[A(q2,1(z))y∗2,2(z)]
=
[(
1− ρ˜
ρ˜
)
/A(q2,1(z)) + γz
][
pˆ2,2
pˆ2,2(z)− γz
] 1
1−ρ
y2,2
=
[
1− ρ˜
ρ˜
]
{1/A(q2,1(z))}
(
ρ˜pˆ2,2
1/A(q2,1(z))
) 1
1−ρ
y2,2 + γz
(
ρ˜pˆ2,2
1/A(q2,1(z))
) 1
1−ρ
y2,2
=
[
1− ρ˜
ρ˜
](
ρ˜pˆ2,2
) 1
1−ρ
q
ρψ2
1−ρ
2,1 y2,2 + γz
(
ρ˜pˆ2,2
) 1
1−ρ
q2.1(z)
ψ2
1−ρ y2,2
=
(
ρ˜pˆ2,2
) 1
1−ρ
y2,2
([
1− ρ˜
ρ˜
]
q
ρψ2
1−ρ
2,1 + γzq2.1(z)
ψ2
1−ρ
)
=
(
ρ˜pˆ2,2
) 1
1−ρ
y2,2
([
1− ρ˜
ρ˜
]{
q2,0(z) +
[
pˆ2,1
pˆ2,1(z)− γz
] 1
1−ρ
y2,2
} ρψ2
1−ρ
+γz
{
q2,0(z) +
[
pˆ2,1
pˆ2,1(z)− γz
] 1
1−ρ
y2,2
} ψ2
1−ρ
)
}
∂v2,2(z)
∂p2,1(z)
=
(
ρ˜pˆ2,2
) 1
1−ρ
y2,2
([
1− ρ˜
ρ˜
]{
pˆ
ρψ2
(1−ρ)2
2,1
(
− 1
1− ρ
ρψ2
1− ρ
)
×
[
pˆ2,1(z)− γz
] −ρψ2
(1−ρ)2
y
ρψ2
1−ρ
2,2
+γz pˆ
ψ2
(1−ρ)2
2,1
(
− 1
1− ρ
ψ2
1− ρ
)[
pˆ2,1(z)− γz
] −ψ2
(1−ρ)2
y
ψ2
1−ρ
2,2
})
< 0
∂v22,2(z)
∂p2,1(z)∂γz
=
(
ρ˜pˆ2,2
) 1
1−ρ
y2,2
([
1− ρ˜
ρ˜
]{
pˆ
ρψ2
(1−ρ)2
2,1
(
− 1
1− ρ
ρψ2
1− ρ
)
× ρψ2
(1− ρ)2
[
pˆ2,1(z)− γz
] −ρψ2
(1−ρ)2−1
y
ρψ2
1−ρ
2,2
+pˆ
ψ2
(1−ρ)2
2,1
(
− 1
1− ρ
ψ2
1− ρ
)[
pˆ2,1(z)− γz
] −ψ2
(1−ρ)2
y
ψ2
1−ρ
2,2
+γz pˆ
ψ2
(1−ρ)2
2,1
(
− 1
1− ρ
ψ2
1− ρ
)
ψ2
(1− ρ)2
[
pˆ2,1(z)− γz
] −ψ2
(1−ρ)2−1
y
ψ2
1−ρ
2,2
}
< 0
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